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ABSTRACT
In the late 1970s countries in Latin America's Southern Cone attempted
to lower domestic inflation rates through the progressive reduction of a
preannounced rate of exchange—rate devaluation. The stabilization programs
gave rise to massive capital inflows, real exchange—rate appreciation, and
current—account deficits. This paper develops a stylized intertemporal frame-
work in which the effects of a preannounced exchange—rate oriented disinflation
scheme can be studied. It is shown that even when agents have perfect foresight
and markets clear continuously, the "capital inflows" problem and the associated
real appreciation may result.
While unanticipated, permanent inflation changes are neutral in the paper,
anticipated inflation is neutral only in exceptional circumstances. A pre—
announced disinflation operates by altering the path of an expenditure—based
real domestic interest rate that depends on expected changes in the prices of
liquidity services and nontradable consumption goods. Alternatively, by raising
future real balances, anticipated disinflation may cause an incipient change
in the time path of consumption's marginal utility, leading agents to revise
consumption plans. It is noteworthy that disinflation's long—run effect on
the real exchange rate more than reverses its short—run effect. If disinflation
occasions a real appreciation on impact, say, the relative price of tradables
must rise in the long run so that the economy can service the additional
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In the late 1970s countries in Latin America's Southern Cone attempted to
lower their domestic inflation rates through the progressive reduction of a
praannounced rate of exchange—rate devaluation. The exchange—rate orjented
disinflationschemes accompanied wide—ranging liberalization programs aimed at
reducing fiscal deficits., deregulating domestic financial markets1 and removing
most impediments to external trade in goods and assets. While the timing and
magnitudes of the various policy initiatives differed among Argentina, Chile,
and Uruguay, three features of the stabilization programs have attracted
considerable attention. First, capital—account liberalization encouraged extensive
toreign borrowing and rapid growth of central—bank foreign reserves. Second,
disinflation coincided with substantial rises in domestic price levels relative
to import prices, i.e., with real exchange—rate appreciation. Third, current
account balances worsened, so that the net external debts of these economies
increased more quickly.1
Figures for Argentina, drawn from Calvo (1983), illustrate this 'capital
inflows problem." Although a plan of preannouncing the exchange rates path was
introduced only in December 1978, the disinflation process in Argentina began in
early 1976. Between the end of 1976 and the end of 1980, central—bank reserves
rose from 1.8 to 7.7 billion U.S. dollars, having reached 10.5 billion dollars at
the end of 1979 prior to the domestic banking crisis that marked the beginning
of the end of stabilization. On average, the rate of inflation in the consumer
price index exceeded the currency's depreciation rate against the dollar by 74.5
percent per annum between late 1977 and late 1980. Siven the much lower rate of
dollar price inflation over that period, a massive and sustained real appreciation
resulted. The current—account response was less immediate, with the surpluses of
1976—1978 giving way to a deficit of 4.8 billion dollars by 1980.This paper attempts to explain aspects oftheSouthern Cone experience
by developing a simple intertemporal optimizing framework and using it to study
a. small open economys response to a preannounced, gradual disinflation. The
paper has as its focus the capital inflows problem, and shows how the phenomenon
may result from an optimal private—sector response to a phased reduction
in inflation. Anticipated disinflation operates by altering the path ofan
apenditure—based real domestic interest rate that depends on expected changes
in the prices of liquidity services and nontradable consumption goods.
Alternatively, anticipated disinflation, by raising future desired real balances,
may cause an incipient change in the time path of consumptions marginal utility,
thus leading individuals to alter their previous expenditure plans.
The framework developed below is highly stylized, and does not pretend to
offer a realistic description of Southern Cone economies or a complete account
of events there. Other authors have emphasized alternative channels through
which disinflation might have had real effects of the type observed. Rodriguez
(1982) argues that domestic inflation expectations are sluggish in the short run,
so that a reduction in the rate of depreciation immediately reduces the real
interest rate through its effect on the nominal rate. This change in turn
stimulates spending, causing real appreciation. Dornbusch (1982) ties real
appreciation to a domestic inflation rate that adjusts only gradually to goods—
market disequilibrium. Caivo (1993) discusses several hypotheses, including
portfolio shifts into domestic nonmoney assets and public disbelief in official
renunciations of surprise maxi—devaluations. Each of these mechanisms enjoys some
degree of empirical plausibility, but no simple model can capture the complexity
of a structural economic revolution involving tax and tariff reforms and banking
decontrol as well as major shifts in monetary, fiscal, and exchange—rate policy.
The goal of the present work is to elucidate a channel through
which capital inflows and real appreciation may occur even if agents haverational expectations, policy is credible, and continuous market clearing prevails.
The papers aodels therefore demonstrate that the capital inflows phenomenon is
not in itselfevidenceof price stickiness or suboptimal expectations formation.
Further, the techniques introduced here permit analysis of a gradual decline in
the rate of currency devaluation rather than the unrealistic permanent and
unanticipated reduction studied in the previous literature.In fact, only the
forier policy has real effects in the models set out below.h
Partially offsetting the advantage of the papers technique is a weakness:
the assumption that the monetary authority's policy takes the form of a one—time,
immutable announcement of all future depreciation rates. While formal exchange—
rate tables were published in Chile From January 1978 and in Argentina and
Uruguay from December 1978, they covered only a limited future period and therefore
appeared periodically.In addition, the capital inflows problem predates the
tables' introduction. The perfect—foresight assumption is adopted here because
it produces a tractable benchmark model that lays bare some economic forces
difficult to analyze in a more complex, stochastic setting.'
While the paper has its roots in the recent (and rather short—lived)
Southern Cone experience with disinflation and liberalization, it relates also
to a classic theoretical question in monetary theory, the superneutrality of
money. The model explored here assumes individual intertemporal preferences
of the type postulated by Sidrauski (1967); and it therefore has the property,
mentioned above, that unanticipated but fully understood permanent changes in
inflation do not alter the time path of the economy's stock of productive
nonmonetary assets. The paper shows, however, that inflation changes that
would be neutral if unanticipated can affect the economy's path if they are
expected in advance. The result underscores the point that the inflation
rate is a real variable, changes in which will have no real effects only in
exceptional circumstances.4—4—
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections I and II set out a
model of a single consumption good economy open to international trade and
capital movements. Under the crawling—peg exchange—rate regime assumed, it is
the publics demand for money that determines the degree to which the country's
external asset acquisitions are monetized through central—bank foreign exchange
intervention. This model of course does not permit an analysis of the real
exchange rate, but it does provide a relatively simple setting in which the
economic effects of preannounced disinflation become apparent.
The impact and transitional effects of that disturbance are investigated
in section III. Private—sector preferences play a key role in determining the
qualitative nature of the economy's short—run and long—run responses. When
the marginal utility of consumption rises with real money holdings, the
announcement of disinflation causes an impact capital outflow, a fall in
consumption, and a corresponding current—account surplus. For the class of
utility functions studied here (the constant relative risk aversion class), this
corresponds to the case in which the substitution effect of the concomitant rise
in the expenditure—based interest rate dominates the income effect. When the
marginal utility of consumption is a declining function of real balances——i.e.,
when the income effect of interest—rate changes dominates——the impact of an
announced disinflation program involves a sharp capital inflow, a rise in
consumption, and a current deficit. In contrast to the previous case, the
transition path is necessarily characterized by a private capital account
surplus, and thus is suggestive of the Southern Cone stabilization experience.
Only when the utility function is separable in consumption and real balances is
money fully superneutral.
Section IV introduces nontradable consumption goods so that the real
exchange rate's behavior can be studied. The appropriate definition of "real
balances becomes an important question in a two consumption good setting, and—5—
a novel answer, related to work of Michener (1984), is proposed in this section.
Section Vtakesup the analysis of disinflation. The same conditions on
preferences as in section III determine whether the impact effect entails a fall
in consumption and real balances or a rise.If consumption increases on impact,
there is a real appreciation followed by a transitional period in which external
assets decline the relative price of nontradables falls, and (for reasonable
parameter values) central—bank reserves increase.It is noteworthy that a
disinflation program moves the real exchange rate in opposite directions in the
short run and in the long run.If the immediate effect of disinflation is a
current deficit and a real appreciation, sayq the real exchange rate must
depreciate in the long run so that the economy can service the new external debt
it has incurred. Bruno (1976) has also observed that a program of sustained
external borrowing calls for an eventual real depreciation.
Section VI contains some concluding remarks.
I.A One Consumption Good Model
The analysis is concerned with a small open economy facing a perfect
world capital market. To illustrate the basic idea of the paper in a relatively
simple setting, I assume initially that all individuals demand a single,
tradable consumption good, the domestic supply of which is exogenous and fixed
at y. This perishable consumption good can be thought of as a composite
whose components have fixed relative prices. Section IV will relax the
foregoing assumptions, introducing a nontradable good and domestic supply
responses so that variations in the real exchange rate can be studied. Until
then, the adjective 'real" is to be understood as meaning "measured in terms
of the single consumption good."
Two assets are available: domestic money (held by domestic residents
only) and an internationally tradable bond whose face value is fixed in terms——
ofthe consumption good.All money is taken to be high—powered, so the domestic
banking system is ignored. The real return on bonds is determined in the world
capital marketandis constant at the level p. The foreign—currency price of
the single consumption good is also fixed (at unity, say); thus, the domestic
inflation rate, ii,maybe identified with the rate of depreciation of the
currency. The exchange rate——the domestic—currency price of foreign currency
——ispeggedby the country's central bank, which holds interest—bearing
foreiqn' reserves (here, interest—bearing consumption—indexed bonds) for
thIs purpose. Although instantaneously pegged, the exchanqe rate need not be
constant, but instead may follow any path chosen by the monetary authority.
In effect, the latter chooses the path of domestic inflation.It is important
to remember that under conditions of capital mobility, the central bank can peg
the exchange rate only if it automatically accommodates any change in private
money demand through purchases or sales of foreign reserves.






In (1), the instantaneous utility function u(.,.) depends on consumption
(c) and real balances (in), defined as nominal money holdings UI) deflated
by the domestic price level (P).As usual, the utility function is
increasing in both c and in,strictlyconcave, twice continuously
differentiable, and it satisfies the Inada conditions. The parameter in
(1) is the agents constant subjective time—preference rate.
Let b0 denote initial net private bond holdings and
the expected path of real transfers from the government. The individual 's
intertemporal budget constraint takes the form+ (i + p)mf]exp(—pt)dt￿ (y/p) +m.+
b0
+foTtppt)dt.
Constraint (2) states that the present value of lifetime expenditure cannot
exceed the present value of lifetime income. The expenditure concept it
embodies encompasses both spending on consumption and spending on liquidity
services, the real price of the latter good being the nominal interest rate
+p.gents are assumed to possess perfect foresight regarding
the future paths of inflation and transfer payments, so no notational
distinction is made between expected and realized values.
Necessary conditions for a solution to the consumers problem are
derived by differentiating the Lagrangian expression
—'t
LSu(c,m)e dt
+i C(y/p)+in+b+J'rexp(—pt)dt—J'm[c+ (n + p)m]exp(—pt)dt,
() 0 0ut 0 t L t
where is a multiplier. canbe interpreted as the initial
shadow value of wealth. If it is assumed for convenience that the time—




= + p), (4)
for all t.5 Conditions (3) and (4) by themselves do not suffice to
determine the individuaFs optimal expenditure program, however. The
unique, "correct" value of p0 is the one allowing the intertemporal
budget constraint (2) to hold as an equality when the paths of—8-
consumption and real baiartcs are given by (3) and (4)
Explicitcomputation of the optimalindividualplan requiresthat
the foreqoing assumptions be specialized. The utility function u(. .) is
now restricted to the constant relative risk aversion family,
c 1—s l—R
u(c1m) =ftin )/tl—R, (5)
where R > 0 and s (0,1). Equations (3)—(5) imply that along a perfect—





It is evident that spending on both goods is a declining function of the
utility shadow price p1,.Combination of (6) and (7) with constraint (2)
shows that the shadow price characterizing an optimal individual plan is
I, = (8)
[(yip) +in11 + b
+$Tppt)dt]
IFno unanticipated shocks occur, Bellman's principle implies that the optimal
shadow value p computed by the individual at any time s later than 0 must equal
the value p1 given by (8). Thus, for any s0 it must also be true that





C(yip)+ m_+b+T expC—p(t—s)]dt) sst—9—
Before describin the equilibrium of this economy, it remains to describe
the behavior of the public sector. For this purpose it is convenient to con-
solidate the budgets of the central bank and the 'fiscal authority. At any time
t, the central bank holds foreign reserves rt and earns interest prt.
The gOvernment finances an exogenous public consumption level and net
lump—sum transfers through the central bank's foreign interest earnings
and the expansion of central—bank credit. The fiscal authority does not itself
issue interest—bearing debt. The transfer level is assumed to adjust
endogenously so that the time derivative of domestic credit (measured in real
terms) is domestic credit expansion just compensates residents
for the real depreciation of their money holdings. The level of real transfers




The'fiscal policy rule summarized in (10) is not intended as a realistic
description of policies actually pursued in the Southern Cone. Rather, it is an
idealized benchmark case, reflecting a policy that seeks consistency between
the devaluation rate and the monetized fiscal deficit so that excessive foreign
reserve fluctuations are avoided. While this consistency may not have been
attained ex post, there is evidence that it was a desideratum of the
stabilization plans as originally formulated.6 It is useful to remember
the following implication of domestic credit rule (10): Dc =Dr(where D
denotes a time derivative). To see this, note that the time derivative of
the nominal money supply is the sum of the time derivatives of its foreign and
domestic source components: DM =PDr+irti.It follows that Dc =DM/P—ire
=Dr.'— 1(3—
II. Perfect—Foresight Equilibrium
The previous section section calculated the time—invariant shadow value
of wealth associated with an optimal individual plan. The individual plan
is formulated on the basis of expected future paths of inflation and real
transfers.in turn, the present value of government transfers plus consumption
is, through the public sector's intertemporal budget constraint, limited
by the path of private money demand and the resulting seigniorage revenue. In
this section I discuss the economy's perfect—foresight equilibrium path,
along which the expected and realized paths of transfers coincide and the
governments intertemporal constraint is satisfied.
key result is that anticipated changes in inflation generally do
influence the path of the current account, even though permanent, unanticipated
changes jr a constant inflation rate do not. The result implies that money is
superneutral only in rather special circumstances.
Let m denote private money demand. The government's intertemporal
budget constraint takes the form
+ p(—ptdtr0 +5(Dm
+tmtp(-pt)dt (11)
in the present context.In words, the present value of government spending is
limited by initial government assets plus the present value of seigniorage.
Consider now the typical individual 's interteinporal constraint (2) and
assume that individuals base their decisions on the transfer path appearing in
(11) (along with the announced path of inflation) and that the resulting path of
private money demand allows (11) to hold.In other words, assume a perfect—





Money is a nontradable asset, so (12) states that the present value of national
absorption is limited by the present value of the nations tradable resources.
As noted in the previous section, the individual constraint (2) must
hold with equality if individual plans are optimal. After interating by parts,
it is evident that under the credit rule (10), (11) and (12) both hold with
equality in equilibrium provided llmt exp(_pt)m =0.(Because real balances
mustbenonneqative, the foregoin limit must also be nonnegative.) This
condition is henceforth assumed, so that





Given the form of the utility function assumed in (5), the individual
always devotes a fraction cj of his expenditure to consumption. Because the







This information yields the equilibrium initial shadow value of wealth,
i.e., the unique value consistent with individual optimality, perfect foresight,







r0is the stock of net claims on foreigners owned






along a perfect—foresight equilibrium path.(Of course, (15) and (16) could also
have been derived directly by solving (14) for using (6).)As is
typically the case in asset—pricing models assuming rational expectations the
(shadow) asset price depends on the entire expected future paths of
inflation, output, and government spending, as well as on the economy's initial
position as summarized by the predetermined quantity
The model can be used to derive the equilibrium level of the current—
account balance along a fulfilled perfect—foresight path. Private—sector asset
accumulation is given by Dm +Db=y+pb+r—ire—c;and because government
spending in excess of revenue is financed by reserve loss, DrDc +ire+pr—
g
—'r.This implies the relation Of =y+pf
—c—g,which expresses the change
in the net foreign claims of the economy as a whole——the current—account balance——
as the difference between national income and absorption. Since Dc =Drby (1O>
the current account also equals net saving by the private sector; but under a
pegged exchange rate and capital mobility, the private sector can freely exchange
foreign bonds for money (and vice versa) at the central bank, and thus can
accumulate wealth in the form of domestic money as well as in the form of
foreign claims. As was noted above, the national stock of foreign claims f is
given at any point in time by the past history of the current account.It is the
public's demand for money that determines the division of f between private bond
holdings b and official reserves r.
Recall that the multiplier p* remains constant through time in the ab-
sence of unanticipated shocks. Differentiation of (16) therefore yields the
equilibrium current account as a function of current and anticipated future
inflation rates and levels of public consumption:-(l-) (1-R)/R
1T+pI
Df= p - 7___7
—{(yIp)++ —p expC—pt—s.l ]dtj
s —r),r S
fiTt+p) expE—p(t—s))dt
+Cpj'g expf-p(t-s)Jdt-g}. (17) st
Equation (17) elucidates the link between inflation fluctuations and external
asset accumulation. On its right—hand side there are two terrns the first
reflecting the current—account response to anticipated inflation and the second
the response to anticipated changes in government consumption.
The effect of public consumption movements is quite conventional: the
private sector offsets the temporary tax changes these imply, thus smoothing
its consumption, by running current deficits when government spending exceeds
is permanent" level and running surpluses in the opposite case.If government
spending is expected to remain constant for all t ￿s,the second term on the
right—hand side of (17) is zero.(I have assumed away anticipated changes in
the endowment y, which, after a sign change, have the same effect as anticipated
changes in g.)
The effect of inflation movements requires more discussion, and therefore
is studied in detail in the next section. For now, note that if the inflation
rate is expected to remain constant tat 1T*, say) for all t ￿s,the first
right—hand side term in (17) is zero. Further, a permanent, unanticipated
change in i* leaves the current account unchanged, and thus itself induces no
change in the nationally—owned stock of foreign claims. Real balances inand
hence utility do change, of course, remaining at their new levels forever. But
the central—bank reserve sales that accommodate this fall in inhaveno effect
on the econoinys consumption possibilities, for they represent a transfer of
foreign assets from the central bank to the public rather than a change in the
economys net external claims f.As in the Brock (1974), Calvo (1979) and
Fischer (1979b) perfect—foresight versions of Sidrauski 's (1967) monetary growth
model, one—time changes in a constant inflation rate are superneutral in the—14—
sense that they do not alter the economys stock of productivenonmonetary assets.
This is, however a veryspecialresult according to c17) .InQeneral ,therate
of e<ternal asset accumulation is a function ofthecurrent inflation rate and
of the expected future inflation path.
When R =1,so that the utility function takes the logarithmic form
u(cqn)ln(c) +(1—)ln(m),theeffect of inflation in (17) disappears.In
this case, inflation, regardless of its path, has no consumptioneffects.
There isadichotomy between the real and monetary sides of the economywhen
R =1because the utility function is then separable in consumptionand real
balances.
III. Preannounced Disinflation
The balance—of—payments effects of a preannounced disinflation are now
considered. The program is first revealed to the public at time zero,and it
is assumed for simplicity that, prior to the announcement ofthe disinflation
plan, the inflation rate had been expected to remainconstant at level 1T*forall
time. Qnce the disinflation program is announced, however, agentsanticipate a
new inflation path {ut}..) that declines over timefrom an initial
level iTo=
Useequation (15) to write the preannouncement (pre—preannouncement?)
level of the equilibrium wealth shadow value as
* = . 18)
+f0
—Jgexp(_Pt)dt]
The value of this multiplier just after the announcement depends onthe newly—








Theinitial jump in the multiplier (from to ) determines
the impact eect of the announcement. Because the multiplier will thereafter
remain constant at the level given by (19) (barring further surprises),
equation (16) (or, equivalently, (17)) shows how the stock of external claims
evolves over time. There are three cases to consider R 1, R > 1, and the
logarithmic case. To ease the exposition, I assume that the path of government
consumption is flat at an unchanged level both before and after the disinflation
programs implementation.0
her R1, a rise in real balances raises the marginal utility of con-
sumption (i.e.uis positive). s (18) and (19) show, exceeds in
this case real balances are expected to grow over time as inflation declines,
and so the new, constant shadow value ofrealassets must be higher than it was
before the announcement of future disinflation.'1 Because ir*,(6)and (7)
reveal that the announcement occasions a sharp initial fall in both consumption
and desired real balances. The price level, which is pegged, cannot jump upward,
so the money market is brought to equilibrium by an immediate fall in nominal
balances that has as its counterpart a reserve loss by the central bank. Because
consumption falls initially in this case, reducing money demand, preannounced
disinflation paradoxically causes a private capital outflow on impact.
The fall in consumption entails an improvement in the current account,
and as (16) shows, the economy5s external assets rise over time as a result of
disinflation. Real balances and hence reserves rise also as inflation falls
(by (7)). Because DfDb +Dr(the balance—of—payments identity), private
capital outflow does not fully finance the rest of the world's current deficit
vis—a—vis the home country.In fact, the private capital account may at times
be in surplus (i.e., Db0) during the transition to lower inflation.-16-
This occurs when the public runs down its net external assets to finance its
increasing demand ar money, so that the rate of central—bank reserve
accumulation, Dr, exceeds the overall rate of increase in the economys
external claims, Of. As (6) indicates, consumption rises during the adjustment
process in the present case.
When R > 1 (so that Uis negative), the equilibrium multiplier falls
from to at time zero, as (18) and (19) show.This initial drop is again
a consequence of the newly—expected growth in real balances, which now lowers
the optimal constant shadow value of assets. Consumption and real balances
rise on impact, with the initial portfolio shift from bonds to money accommodated
through a central—bank purchase of reserves from the public. There is thus a
sharp capital inflow. The rise in consumption implies an impact worsening of
the current account deficit.All the immediate effects of disinflation are the
opposite of those that occur when consumption and real balances are complementary
goods, rather than substitutes.
Equation (16 tells us that when R exceeds unity, can remain
constant at its postshock value while inflation is falling only if the con-
solidated foreign asset stock f declines over time. Consumption falls but real
balances rise during the transition to a lower inflation rate, as can be
seen from (6) and (7).Given the equality between Dr and Dm, the adjustment
path necessarily involves continuing balance—of—payments surpluses. The
conjunction of a current deficit and an even larger private capital—account
surplus replicates some stylized facts of the Southern Cone experience during
the late 1970s. An example:In 1979, the first year of its preannounced
exchange—rate table, Argentina's central bank had a reserve gain of 4.4 billion
U.S. dollars even though the current account registered a .5 billion dollar
deficit.
As was noted above, money is superneutral in the borderline case R =1.—17--
Because the instantaneous utility function is then separable in its two
arquments, no time variation in consumption need occur to hold the marginal
utility of consumption constant at the postshock (and preshock)
equilibrium shadow value of wealth. Accordinqly real balances (and
official foreign reserves) rise during the disinflation; while there are
continual private capital inflows during the transition, there is no
current imbalance at any time (Ob=
—Dr5,
for all s 0).
The foregoing results may be viewed from a perspective stressing
disinflations effect on a real interest rate defined in terms of the
home expenditure bundle. Because domestic expenditure falls on money
services as well as on consumption, the relevant consumer price index is
a function of the prices of both. Intertemporal variation in the nominal
interest rate——the consumption price of money services——entails a parallel
variation in the price index, and hence in the expenditure—based interest
rate perceived by domestic residents. These interest rate movements can be
expected to influence consumption decisions, with the precise result
depending on the curvature of the instantaneous utility function. —
Tomake this idea formal, it is convenient to suspend temporarily
the previous assumption that the world interest rate p is fixed and equal
to the time—preference rate .Assumeinstead that the world rate follows
the exogenous path {Pf}Ø. Under this new assumption, the discount
factor exp(—pt) must be replaced by the factor exp(—$pdv) in the
analysis of sections I and II. As a result, the shadow price z is no
longer constant along perfect—foresight paths, but is instead given by
=p0exptt0(—p)dv].
It is straightforward to proceed as before and derive the equilibrium-18—
initial shadowpriceofwealth,p. Substitution ofinto the










Now the expenditure—based interest rate is just the consumption—good rate p
less the expected change in the consumption—good price of the expenditure
bundle,(l—)Dln(ir+p).(Recall that the share of money services in spending
is 1—a.) As (20) shows, however, equilibrium consumption depends on the entire
expected future path — ofthis rate. The effect
of the expenditure interest rate on consumption is indeterminate, a reflection
of the tension between income and substitution effects. As is well known
for the class of utility functions described by (5), substitution effects
dominate when R is less than unity. When R exceeds unity, however, marginal
utility falls off quickly with additional spending, and so intertemporal
substitution is costly.In this case, therefore, income effects dominate,
and an upward shift in the path of real interest rates, say, causes the
denominator of (20) to fall. For the logarithmic consumer the two effects
offset each other exactly: when R =1,the expenditure—based interest rate
does not affect consumption.
Return to the assumption that the path of p is flat, and consider
again a disinflation program. Because the inflation rate is expected to
decline steadily in the wake of the programs announcement, the path of the
expenditure interest rate shifts upward. As equation (20) shows, consumption
falls on impact if R is less than 1, rises if R exceeds 1, and is unaffected if
R =1.Thus, when the utility function is a member of the constant relative—19—
risk aversion family, our previous results may be ascribed to disinflations
effect on the interest rate relevant to private intertemporal allocation
dec iSi OflS.
IV.TheRole of Nontradable Goods
The goal of this section is to develop a framework in which disinflation's
effect on the relative price of nontradable and tradable goods can be studied.
It is therefore assumed that the economy is endowed with a concave production
frontier describing the possibilities far transforming tradables into nantradables.
The price of nantradables in terms of tradables is p.The inverse of p is often
referred to as the real exchange rate, with a real appreciation defined as a
N rise in p. Output of nontradables is an increasing function y (p) of
their relative price, while tradable output yT(p) decreases when p rises.
Profit maximization by firms equates p to society's marginal rate of
transformation, so that p-yT' 1Ni(p)
In modelling the economy's demand side, a potential difficulty is the
appropriate definition of lireall balances when two consumption goods with a
variable relative price are available. Liviatan (1981)! in a related
model, defines real balances as nominal money deflated by the money price of
nontradables. Michener (1984) deflates nominal balances by an arbitrary
homogeneous price index in T and PM, the nominal prices of tradables
and nontradables. Below, a somewhat different approach is taken. The
analysis can be viewed as providing a partial justification for Michener's
(1984> assumptions.
Assume that the consumer's instantaneous utility is a function of two
variables only, a homogeneous index of consumption of tradables and nontradables,
T N
z(c ,c ),andsome measure of liquidity services. Thus, utility is
implicitly separable in consumption and money services (see Deaton and—20—
?iueiibauer(1990)>.Define P(PT,PN) to be the nominal unit subutility ex-
perditure fucton associated with z(.,.), that is, the smallest money expenditure
that raises the index z(...) by one unit when money prices are T and Then
P(PT4P') provides the natural measure of thepurchasing power of money.
Accordingly, 'real" balances may be defined as H/P (pT,pN) Clearly P (.4.)is
homogeneous of first degree in its arguments, as is the price index assumed by
Michener (1984).1
internationally traded bonds remain indexed to tradable goods as in earlier
sections, and these are still the only asset other than money. The individuals
problem can therefore be stated as follows: choose paths for consumption and
nominal balances that maximize
V = (21)
subject to the intertemporal budget constraint





The rate of currency depreciation ineedno longer equal the overall inflation
rate, the rate at which money loses its real value. Now iisthe rate of
increase in the nominal price of tradable goods.
To obtain a model solution I will again postulate a particular form for
the utility function.It is assumed that the consumption index resides within
the class
I N T,p N 1— z(c ,c ) (c .(c) , 23)—"1—
T N where (0,1).Forthis Cobb—Douglas subutility function, P(P,P ) is
easily shown to be After normalizing, we may
define real balances, again denoted m, by
Mj(PTiPN) (24)
The instantaneous utility function is taken to be of the form
TN. T N x l—m 1—R utz (c ,c ),m]=Czc ,c) a ] /1—R,
where R0 andE (0,1).
Let denote as before the Lagrange multiplier associated with
the rnaximiztion of (21) subject to (22). Then (23)H25) imply the following
demand functions for tradables, nontradables, and real balances:
(26)
• 1/R—(1—m)(1—R)/R —m(1—)(1—R)/R1— —(1—m)(1—R)/R •
[Pt"1— t t+Ptm
= (27)
1/8 [u(1—R)—1J/R [(1—a+)(1—R)—1)/R 1— —(1—u)(1—R)/R
(1T+p)/(l_a))
(28)
• 1/8 [e8(1—R)—1]/R • —m.(1—)(1—R)/Rt— • [m(1—R)—1]/R
Combination of (26)—(28) with constraint (22) yields the shadow price of wealth
along an optimal individual plan,=
(1(iR)TN TR
.(29)
Assume for simplicity that the government consumes tradable goods only
and that it follows the domestic—credit rule
+pr (30)
which implies as before that D(M/PTi =Dr.The Qovernments intertemporal
=drT . d uuugCt consrainL is given y liwitn'replacingm ano it
holdsas an equality under (30)iflimt exp(-pt)(M/P)
0.
In perfect—foresight equilibrium, individuals optimize given their
expectations concerning future values of ii,r,and p; the public sector obeys
its intertemporal constraint; the market for nontradable goods clears at each
moment; and market—clearing prices equal the expected prices that underlie
individual decisions. Associated with a perfect—foresight equilibrium path
is a Lagrange multiplier consistent with continuous equilibrium in
the home goods market, so that
N. * N
c 0,wt,Pt) y
for all t0. Condition (31) gives the equilibrium price of nontradables
implicitly as a function of and w,
=p(p,1Tt).
Itis useful in the subsequent discussion to solve explicitly for the natural
logarithm of p. Letdenote the constant relative—price elasticity of supply
in the nontradable sector. Then by (27)1
* (1—a)(1—R)
lnp = I + — 1n +k
-
(1—Ri— — 1 (1—R) — — 1
in equilibrium, where k is a constant. Equation (32)showsthat p is a
decreasing function of p. In contrast, the partial effect of iTon
is ambi.iuaus, being positive when R > 1 and negative when R <
Ifwe assume perfect—foresight equilibrium, combine the private— and
public—sector budget constraints, and impose market—clearinQ condition (31),






Inequilibrium, the present value of private consumption of tradabies must
equalthe present value of the economys tradable output net of government
consumption. This is just the analogue of condition (13). Combining (29), (31),
and 33) and recalling that is the share of tradable consumption in private
spending, we find that is defined implicitly by the relationship
0*(t)(1—Ri/R —(l—m) (1—R)/R R
* exp(—pt)dti
(•4)
Further, for any s ￿ 0,
* —(1—p)(1—R)/R S —(1—a)ti—R)/R R
*S5pc,t E(1rt+pJ/(l_u)) expC—p(t—s)]dt1
=m:
Notethat (34) may be used in concert with (26)todisplay equilibrium con-
sumption as a function of wealth and the path of an expenditure—based
interest rate (equation (20) does this for the one—good model).In the
present context, however, the relevant interest rate is p —(1—)Dlnp—
1—m)(D1n(ir+p)+(1—)Dlnp.This measure adjusts the tradables rate p by-t
expenditure—weightedchanges in the tradable—good price of nontradables p,
as well as expenditure—weighted changes in the tradable—good price of real
money services, p1(ir+p).
V.Disinflation and the Real Exchange Rate
To study the effect of a change in the inflation path, a diagram showing
the determination of by (34) is useful. Let Q(I) denote the
right—hand side of eauation (34). Direct calculation usinq (32) yields the
elasticity ofthe(p) schedule:
dlnQ (1-)(1-R) {R/t1 -(1-R)+ R])p(p,t)y''[p(p,t)]exp(_pt)dt — + (16)
dlnp 1 —(l—R)+ oR (f(y Cp,H —g}exP(—pt)dt+ f)
A rise in u lowers p for all t ￿ 0.When R < I the slope of the Q(L1) schedule
is therefore ambiguous, but it has an elasticity less than unity, as (36) shows.
When R .1the schedule slopes downward. The determination of may
therefore be depicted as in figures 1 CR1) and 2 CR 1).
Consider now the experiment of a preannounced, phased reduction in
the rate of currency depreciation. The experiment may again be viewed as a
change in the expected path of price inflation in the tradables sector from
a constant path Ci*} to a declining path with ir*.
A flat government—consumption trajectory is again assumed for expository
conveni ence.
Prior to the programs announcement at time zero, the equilibrium
shadow value of wealth is the solution to
*() {p(,*)U (l_R)/Rexp(_pt)dt}R
p = .(37) 0 - xp(pt)dt +
Figure 3 shows the determination of in the case R < 1.How does theO /iJ\ IJU
t4 I' *(f4)
*
fochange in the expected inflation path shift Q(i)? When R1, a fall in 11raises
equilibrium p (see (32)).However,the elasticity of the integrand in the




which is negative if P 1.Thus, for a given p the numerator of Q(i) rises as
a result of disinflation. Since a rise in p lowers output of tradables, the
denominator simultaneously declines, so that the Q(p) schedule in figure 3 shifts
upward. The postannouncement equilibrium shadow value given by (34) is
therefore higher than the prior value given by (37).
In the case R > 1, p and iTmovein the same direction, given p.It follows
immediately from (37) that Q(p) shifts downward upon the announcement of the
disinflation scheme. While this case is not pictured, figure 2 indicates that
the equilibrium multiplier falls to the level defined by (34). The
disinflation program of course has no effect on figure 2 when R =1,for in that
case p is independent of iT.
Armedwith the foregoing information, one can use (34) and (35) as in
section III to trace out the path of the external asset position. It is easy
to verify that the results are qualitatively identical to those reported in that
section .Inparticular, the case R > 1 is again characterized by an initial
rise in consumption of both goods and in money holdings. The economy's subsequent
path in this case involves a succession of current—account deficits.
What is most noteworthy in the present setting is the behavior of the
real exchange rate. When R < 1, the initial fall in demand occasioned by the
rise in the shadow value of wealth leads to a fall in p, i.e., a real depreciation.
(Recall that T1= iT*.)Overtime, the relative price of nintradables rises



























 R 1, there is an initial real appreciation, or rise in p4whendisinflation is
announced. This real appreciation accommodates the impact increase in the
demand for nontradabies, and it is reversed over time as the current deficit
di sappears.
Indeed, the only respect in which the present results contradict those
of the single—good model involves the behavior of the transitional balance—of—
payments when R > 1. s was just noted, after the initial real appreciation
there is a steady decline in the relative price of nontradables as disinflation
progresses. For a given e<change rate, a fall in p lowers the real—balance
deflator, and so has an ambiguous net effect on the demand far nominal balances.
The latter effect is negative when R > 1 during disinflation it counteracts and,
if sufficiently strong, may even offset the direct increase in nominal money
demand caused by the declining nominal interest rate. Thus, it is no longer the
case that R > 1 implies an unambiguously positive balance of payments during
disinflation.It turns out that for R sufficiently large, reserves may decline
over time after the impact capital inflow occasioned by the announcement of
disinflation. However, there is alway a band above unity for R such that the
ensuing sequence of current deficits is accompanied by a sequence of even
larger capital—account surpluses, as before.1 The conjunction of real
appreciation, current deficit, and official reserve accumulation replicates the
constellation of events accompanying the Southern Cone stabilization plans.
The results sketched above may again be viewed from the perspective of
disinflation's effect on the expenditure—based domestic interest rate. Even
when p rises over time after an initial decline, the net effect of disinflation
is to raise the whole future path of the expenditure—based rate (see (38)). s
before, this depresses absorption when R1 but stimulates it when R > 1.
The short—run real exchange rate effect of disinflation has now been
clarified, but what of the long—run effect? In other words, how does the realexchange rate; level at the conclusion of the plan compare to its pre—plan
level? The interestin answer is that the real exchanqe rate depreciates in
the lon run if itappreciatesin the short run, and appreciates in the long
run in the opposite case.
Figure4 illustrates this result for the case R 1>1,in which there is
an Impact real appreciation Followed by a sequence of current—account deficits.
The fiqure shows the economy's production possibilities frontier 00 together
with the typical consumer's preferences over tradables and nontradables (i.e.,
• TN, isoquants tor the subutility index z(c ,c).Beforethe announcement
of the stabilization plan, the economy is at the initial equilibrium A with
the real exchange rate equal to (minus) the common slope of 00 andzAzA at A.
A'sposition on QU reflects the assumption that the initial net foreign asset
position of the economy is zero. The announcement of disinflation raises
expenditure above income and moves the economy to B, forcing a real appreciation
to maintain equilibrium in the nontradables sector. At the conclusion of dis-
inflation the economy is at C on a budget line that has now shifted within 00.
Because the economy borrows continuously along its transition path, national
income measured in tradables falls short of national product by an amount equal
to the foreign debt service. The long—run real depreciation is needed because
absorption equals this lower income level once external balance is attained.
Since 1982, when Southern Cone countries came under pressure to reduce external
deficits, real exchange rates have indeed depreciated sharply.
VI.Conclusion
This paper has used an intertemporal maximizing framework to study a
small open economy's response to a gradual, preannounced disinflation. The
model employed draws on the Southern Cone experience of the late 1970s and




that operatesthrough a phased reduction in the depreciation rate of a momentarily
pegged exchange rate. While at best an impressionistic representation of the
economies that underwent exchange—rate oriented stabilization programs, the
model serves to elucidate the effect of disinflation on an expenditure—based
interest rate correspondingto the domestic spending mixThis interest—rate
effect absent when disinflationisabrupt and permanent, allows the model to
replicatethe current deficits, reserve accumulation, and real exchange—rate
appreciation that accompanied Southern Cone stabilization efforts.
It must be reiterated however, that the model cannot provide a full
expl arati on consistent with all facets of the Southern Cone expei ence. For
eampie, it does not explain the sustained and cumulative character of the real
appreciations documented by Calvo (1983) and Harberger (1982>. Nor can it
address the possibility of policy—induced employment fluctuations, discussed by
Buffie (1983). What the model does do is expose, in an austerely neoclassical
equilibrium setting, a real effect of disinflation that one would expect to be
relevant under a variety of assumptions about the economys structure.
For the class of utility functions studied in the paper, the direction of
disinflations expenditure effect hinges on whether the marginal utility of
consumption increases or decreases as real balances rise.It is somewhat
'disturbing that the model's predictions depend so strongly on this sign.A
superior approach would model money's role directly, rather than simply postulating
that real balances somehow yield utility. Attempts to derive hlutility_o+_moneyu
functions from underlying transactions schemes (such as those in Brock (1974),
Feenstra (1984), and Gray (1984)) yield little guidance concerning the relation
between real money holdings and the marginal utility of consumption. Pending
the development of money—demand theories more satisfactory than those available,
it seems unreasonable to rule out any of the possibilities considered above.—29—
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1..Diaz Alejandro (1981) reviews the Southern Cone stabilization experience of
the late 1970s. For a detailed discussion of Argentina's experience, see Calvo
(1983) on Chile, see Edwards (198) and Harberger (1982). Buffie (1983)
includes a discussion of Argentina and Uruguay. Dornbusch (1984) surveys
aspects of the Argentine and Chilean experiences, emphasizing the role of
expected relative—price changes on consumer—durable and investment spending.
2.Alternative models of Southern Cone stabilization include Blejer and
Mathieson (1981), Buffie (1983), Krugman (1980), Obstfeld (1984a) ,andvan
Wijnbergen (1983). See Calvo (1981), Diaiic (1982), and Obstfeld (1981) for
theoretical studies of the effect of once—and—for—all, unanticipated changes in
a constant underlying inflation rate. Rodriguez (1981) analyzes the stability
of policy rules that make the rate of exchange—rate crawl endogenous.
3.It should also be noted that the paper's assumption of unrestricted capital
mobility limits its full applicability to Argentina and Uruguay, both of which
had liberalized their domestic financial systems and capital accounts by the
time exchange—rate preannouncement began. In contrast, the Chilean authorities
initiated capital—account liberalization only in June 1979, the same month in
which their preannounced exchange—rate crawl was terminated and the Chilean
peso's U.S. dollar price was fixed.—3 0—
4.Even when all changes in inflation are unanticipated and permanent, super—
neutrality can break down in models similar to Sidrauski s. Brock (1974, p.
774) presents one example; but there are others. The neutrality of one—time
inflation surprises in this papers model (as in Sidrauski 's) stems from the
assumed constancy of agents subjective time—preference rates. Michenar (1981)
and Obstfeld (1981) descibe maximizing models in which money is not superneutral
because time preference rates are endogenous rather than fixed. Hodrick (1982)
studies the flexible exchange rate analogue ofthesingle—good model developed
below, noting that anticipated changes in monetary growth will in general
causecurrent—accountmovements.He does not derive an explicit solution for
the economys path, however. For discussions of monetary nonneutrality in
alternative models, see Begg (1980), Fischer (1979a), and Weiss (1980).
5.Theassumption ' pis the only possibility consistent with the existence
of a stationary long—run equilibrium for the economy. If this assumption did
not hold, the equilibrium consumption level and stock of foreign claims would
be changing over time even if the inflation rate were expected to remain fixed
forever. The nonconvergence phenomenon is avoided if an endogenous time—
preference rate is postulated, as in Obstfeld (1981), or if individuals have
uncertain lifetimes, as in Blanchard (1984).
6,Arriazu (1983, p 181) summarizes the "basic idea' ofapreannounced
exchange—rate schedule as follows:"If a country wants to have a fixed
rate system and it confronts a large fiscal deficit, it is clear that the
end result would be reserve losses and periodic balance of payments crises
——with devaluations.In these circumstances, if you cannot have a fixed
rate but you want the advantages of a fixed rate system, in the sense of
having more transparent markets, less uncertainty, and items like that,
then one possibility is to proceed as follows: start by estimating how
large the fiscal deficit is going to be and how much monetary base will becrested as a result of this and other factors. This allows an estimate of
how large a Flow demand for monetary base is required to be able to maintain
balance of payments equilibrium, Qiven the fiscal deficit.... The problem
is, therefore, how to estimate the size of a devaluation needed to qenerate
the required flow demand for base money to compensate for the effects of
the fiscal deficit." Strictly speaking, the rule (10) differs from that
describedby Arriazu in that it isthe rate of devaluation, rather than the
deficit, that is the exogenous variable.In general, the problem of finding
ar inflation rate yielding a given level of real resources to the government
can admit multiple solutions or no solution. It should be rioted that in
Argentina before 1981, some official reserve growth was apparently due to a rate
of domestic credit growth that fell short of the rate of crawl (Calvo, 1983>.
7.The precise rate of domestic credit expansion is irrelevant as far as the
economys real equilibrium is concerned; only the balance of payments is
affected.It must be assumed, however, that the rate of credit growth does
not exceed r by so large a margin that the public—sector intertemporal budget
constraint, discussed in the next section, is violated. See Obstfeld (1984b)
for a detailed discussion of this constraint in an open—economy context.In
the present setting, the upper bound on the rate of domestic—credit growth is
the nominal interest rate ir+p.
8.Since it is never optimal for private consumption to be zero, the
denominator of (15) is always positive (cf. (12)).
9.It is convenient to assume that the inflation path is differentiable.
Note that the analysis applies equally to a situation in which the disinflation
program and the possibility of foreign asset trade are introduced
simultaneously (provided the economy is initially in a steady state).If
capital movements were not allowed prior to the stabilization program,
the initial private stock of net foreign claims, b, is zero.10.If trestabilizationprogram is accompanied by a declining path
of government consumption, the current—account surplus will be smaller
thanit would have been if ghad remainedflat.This effect represents
consuaption smoothing by the private sector financed entirely through
private borrowingabroad.
11.There is an implicit assumption that the integral in the numerator of (19)
c o n verges.
12. Bruna(19Th),Dornbusch(1983), and Bbstfeld (1983) develop nonmonetary
optimizingmodelsin which therealinterest rate relevant to consumers
dependson both the worldrate and expectedchangesin trerelativeprice of
nontradables or imports.
13. Asimilar device is used by Svensson and Razin(1983) todefinewithin—
period price indices in a nonmonetary optimizing model. The price index
PL,.) corresponds to the ideal price index discussed by Samuelson and
Swaiuy (1974). After the present paper had been completed, Rob Feenstra drew my
attention to the very general treatment of money in the utility function by
Satuuelsor and Sato (1984), in which the case discussed here is mentioned.
14.Ifthe government consumed nontradable goods as well as tradables, its
demandforthe former would enter the reduced—form relative—price equation
(32) withapositivepartial derivative.
15.Inorder that there be a current deficit accompanied by a greater capital—
account surplus, it must be true that I K R￿ C(1—m) (1+)+(1—p) ]/C1—u(1+)—] if
> 0. If1—(1+u)-￿ 0, a current deficit is accompanied by a balance—
of—payments surplus for any R >1.The foregoing results are derived by combining
I equations (24), (28), and (.2) to derive the reduced—form equation for ln(M/P
changes in which mirror changes in central—bank reserves. The parameter values
for which the capital inflows phenomenon occurs seem quite reasonable.Ref erences
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